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The work is on erned with identi ation of bad signatures
in a sequen e whi h is validated using bat hing. Identi ation odes (idodes) are de ned and their general properties are investigated. A taxonomy of id- odes is given. The generi onstru tion for a wide range of
id- odes is given and its instantiation using mutually orthogonal Latin
squares is des ribed. Hierar hi al identi ation is studied for two ases
when the identi ation pro edure uses a family of id- odes and when
there is a single underlying id- ode. Remarks about future resear h onlude the work.
Abstra t.
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1 Introdu tion
The on ept of digital signatures have evolved onsiderably over the last two
de ades. Handwritten signatures are not suitable in ele troni environment espe ially in the ontext of the ease in whi h ele troni do uments an be opied
and/or ut-and-paste manipulated. Digital signature were invented to prevent
do uments from illegal modi ation. Digital signature en apsulates both the
ontents of the do ument and the signer se ret key in su h a way that veri ation is publi - every body who knows the orresponding publi key of the signer
and the do ument, an validate the signature. Digital money is a spe i kind of
signature whi h is signed (typi ally, blindly) by the bank and used by ustomers
in (almost) the same way as the traditional ash with added important fun tionality { it an be used in transa tions performed over the Internet (ele troni
ommer e).
The relian e of e-Commer e on digital money has a dramati impa t on the
omputing load imposed on the bank. The bank has be ome the fo al point

where all ele troni money (digital signatures) are owing. Observe that before the transa tion is approved, the ele troni money must be validated. Bat h
veri ation is an attra tive short ut for signature validation saving time and
omputing resour es. It is appli able whenever the veri er gets a large number of
digital signatures generated by the same signer provided the signature exhibits
the homomorphi property allowing signatures to be validated in bat hes in the
expense of a single exponentiation.
If the bat h passes the validation, all signatures are onsidered orre t and are
a epted. If however, the bat h fails to pass the validation test, the veri er must
identify invalid signatures in the bat h. Clearly, reje tion of the whole bat h is
not an option. A natural question arises: how to identify invalid signatures in the
bat h so the valid signatures an be a epted ? Additionally, one would expe t
that the identi ation pro ess should be as eÆ ient as possible.

2 Ba kground
Bat h veri ation makes sense if the signatures in a bat h are related or generated by the same signer. There are two types of signatures whi h an be bat hed:
RSA signatures and DSA (DSS) signatures. The RSA signatures use the xed
exponent (publi key of the signer) for veri ation. Assume that we have n messages and their signatures. The signatures an be veri ed independently at the
expense of n exponentiations. The bat h ontaining all signature an be veri ed
at the expense of a single exponentiation plus (n 1) modular multipli ations.
DSA signatures are based on exponentiation when the base is xed and publi ly known (the modular arithmeti s is hosen by the signer). Again n signatures
an be veri ed one by one at the expense of n exponentiations. The bat h of
n signatures are validated using a single exponentiation and (n 1) modular
additions.
These two methods of bat h veri ation are inse ure as an enemy who may
know the veri ation pro ess, may try to get the veri er to a ept invalid signatures. The simplest method of atta k would be to produ e a forged signature
and insert two opies of it in the bat h in su h a way that they an el ea h
other when the veri ation is performed, For instan e in the RSA ase, any
bat h whi h ontains two forged pairs: (mf ; sf ) and (mf 1 ; sf 1 ) where mf is the
forged message (do ument) and sf is the forged signature, passes the veri ation
test.
Bellare, Garay and Rabin [1℄ developed veri ation tests whi h are se ure
against any atta ker. The se urity of the test is measured by the probability
that a ontaminated bat h passes it making the veri er to a ept all invalid or
bad signatures ontained in the bat h. The probability of slipping bad signatures
through the test an be traded with eÆ ien y.
The problem we address in this work is an eÆ ient identi ation of bad signatures after the test fails. There is a general method of bad signature identi ation
whi h is alled \ ut and hoose" in [3℄ or \divide and onquer" in [4℄. It takes a
ontaminated bat h and splits it repeatedly until all bad signatures are identi-

ed. The eÆ ien y of this method depends on the degree of ontamination (or
how many bad signatures are in the bat h) and also on how the bad signatures
are distributed in the bat h.
Note that identi ation of bad signatures resembles the problem of error orre tion. To be able to orre t errors, the ode must learly identify all positions
on whi h errors have o urred. As observed in [4℄, error orre ting odes an be
appli able for bad signature identi ation. There is a major di eren e between
error orre ting odes and identi ation odes or id- odes whi h allow to identify
bad signatures. Computations in error orre ting odes are done in the binary
eld with EXCLUSIVE-OR addition (XOR). The intera tion among valid and
invalid signatures within the bat h are governed by INCLUSIVE-OR (logi al
OR).
The work is stru tured as follows. The model for id- odes is studied in Se tion 3. Se tion 4 investigates general properties of id- odes. Se tion 5 dis usses
taxonomy of id- odes. The general onstru tion based on OR- he king matrix
and its instantiation based on mutually orthogonal Latin squares are given in
Se tion 6. Hierar hi al identi ation is des ribed in Se tion 7. A dis ussion about
further work on id- odes loses the work.

3 The Model
The problem we are dealing with is bad signature identi ation in a bat h whi h
has failed to pass the test. The test T is a probabilisti algorithm whi h takes
a bat h of an arbitrary length and produ es a binary out ome a ept/reje t. It
satis es the following two general onditions:
1. Any lean bat h (whi h ontains all valid signatures) always passes the test.
2. A dirty bat h (whi h ontains one or more bad signatures) fails the test with
an overwhelming probability. In fa t, it is reasonable to assume that a dirty
bat h always fails the test.
We further suppose that the ost of running the test does not depend on the
size of the bat h. This assumption seems to be true for relatively small bat hes
where the omputation e ort is equivalent to a xed sequen e of exponentiations
(see [1℄).

De nition 1. Given a bat h Bu = f(mi ; si )ji = 1; : : : ; ug of signed do uments
(mi is the i-th do ument and si its signature). The identi ation ode IC (u; t)
able to identify up to t bad signatures is a olle tion of sub-bat hes (B1 ; : : : ; Bv )
where Bi  Bu su h that for any possible pattern of up to t bad signatures, the
out omes (the syndrome)
S = (T (B1 ); : : : ; T (Bv ))
uniquely identi es all bad signatures.

The identi ation ode IC (u; t) an be equivalently represented by its v  u
test- he king matrix A = [aij ℄ su h that



(mi ; si ) 2 Bj
aij = 10 ifotherwise
Clearly, for a xed size u of the bat h, one would like to obtain a ode IC (u; t)
with the parameter v as small as possible. Note that v indi ates how many tests

T must be run to identify all bad signatures and it an be onsidered as the
parameter hara terising the eÆ ien y of the ode. The parameter v is upper
bounded by u as it is always possible to design a trivial ode whose matrix A is
the u  u identity matrix. This ode is equivalent to serial validation of signatures
one by one.
The following notation is introdu ed. The ode IC (u; t) is uniquely identi ed
by its (v  u) test- he king matrix A. The entries of A are binary. Columns of
the matrix A are indexed by u signatures in a bat h. So the matrix A an be
seen as a sequen e of olumns of the form
A = (A1 ; : : : ; Au )

The index of the i-th signature in the bat h B u is the i-th olumn Ai . A row
spe i es the orresponding sub-bat h whi h in ludes all signatures for whi h the
entries are 1.
Note that if the i-th signature is bad the syndrome produ ed for a bat h
ontaminated by it is equal to Ai or S (i) = Ai . Given a bat h B u with t bad
signatures. Assume further that the bad signatures have o urred on positions
(b1 ; : : : ; bt ) in the bat h B u . Their orresponding indi es are (Ab1 ; : : : ; Abt ). Denote the syndrome produ ed for the bat h as

S (b1 ; : : : ; bt) = Ab1 _ : : : _ Abt

where _ is bit-by-bit in lusive (logi al) OR. For example, if

2 3
1
66 1 77
A1 = 4 0 5
0

2 3
1
66 0 77
and A2 = 4 5
1
0

2 3
1
66 1 77
then A1 _ A2 = 4 5 :
1
0

4 Properties of Id-Codes
Using an information-theoreti arguments, we argue that there is a lower bound
on the v parameter.
Theorem 1. Given an id- ode IC (u; t) whi h always identi es orre tly any t

bad signatures in the bat h of the size u. Then the number of tests (and the
number of olle tions) v satis es the following inequality

v  log2

t  
X
u

=0 i

i

(1)

Proof. Given a bat h Bu of u elements ontaminated by at most t bad signatures.

The identi ation of bad signatures is possible if the syndromes are distin t for
all patterns of i bad signatures (i  t) so knowing the syndrome, it is possible
to determine the positions of bad signatures in the bat h. Note that there are
t  
X
u

=0 i

i

di erent identi able patterns (in luding the pattern with no bad signature). Now
if we have v sub-bat hes (B1 ; : : : ; Bv ), then the test T applied for a single subbat h Bj ; 0  j  t, provides a binary out ome (pass/fail) so the number of
possible syndromes is 2v . Clearly
2v



t  
X
u

=0 i

i

and the bound des ribed by Equation (1) holds.
Obviously, sear hing for id- odes makes sense if they are better (take less
tests) than the naive id- ode whi h tests bat hes ontaining single signatures.
From Theorem 1 we an derive an interesting orollary.

Corollary 1. Id- odes better than the naive id- ode exist only if t < u=2.
Proof. Note that for t  n=2, the number of tests
2v

u=2  
t  
u  
X
X
1X
u
u
u = 2u 1

i 
i 2
i

=0

i

=0

=0

i

i

Thus the number of tests v must be at least u
for the naive id- ode whi h requires u tests.

1 whi h is almost the same as

De nition 2. An index Ai in ludes Aj if Ai _ Aj = Ai .
Given the matrix A of an id- ode. Observe that if there are two olumns i 6= j
su h that the index Ai in ludes Aj , then the ode is unable to identify whether
there are a single bad signature with the syndrome Ai or two bad signatures
with the syndrome Ai _ Aj . In other words, the matrix A with su h indi es is
not able to identify bad signatures with indi es Aj and Ai . We say that the two
indi es ollide.

Lemma 1. Given identi ation oding with a (v  u) test- he king matrix A.
Assume further that there is an index Ai ( olumn Ai ) su h that its Hamming
weight wt(Ai ) = r, then the number of olliding indi es with Ai is
C# (Ai ) = 2r + 2v

r

2:

Proof. There are two ases where ollision may o ur

{ the index Ai in ludes other indi es (Ai _ Ak = Ai ) for some k,
{ the index Ai is in luded in other indi es (Ai _ Ak = Ak ).
For a given index Ai with its Hamming weight r, we an reate 2r 1 indi es
whi h are in luded in Ai { the rst ase. We an also reate 2v r 1 indi es
whi h in lude Ai { the se ond ase. In e e t, we have to ex lude 2r + 2v r 2
indi es.

Corollary 2. To in rease e e tiveness of identi ation odes we should sele t
weights of indi es so the number of olliding indi es is minimal. The smallest
number of olliding indi es o urs when the Hamming weight of all indi es is v2 .
Assume that we have two indi es Ai and Aj . We an de ne the interse tion
of the two as Ai ^ Aj where ^ is bit-by-bit logi al AND.
Lemma 2. Given two indi es Ai and Aj su h that wt(Ai ) = r1 and wt(Aj ) =
r2 . Denote A = Ai ^ Aj { the maximal index whi h is ontained in both Ai
and Aj and wt(A ) = r. Then the number of indi es whi h ollide with the pair
(Ai ; Aj ) is
C# (Ai ; Aj ) = 2v r1 + 2v r2 + 2r1 +r2 r 2v+r r1 r2 2r1 r 2r2 r :

A = fA1 ; : : : ; Au g. Note that C# (Ai ; Aj )  C# (Ai
be omes the equality only if r = 0. From Lemma 1, we an write

Proof. Denote

C# (Ai _ Aj ) = 2r1 +r2

r

+ 2v+r

r1 r2

_ Aj ) and

2:

Denote #Ai and #Aj the numbers of olliding indi es from Ai and Aj , respe tively, whi h have not been onsidered among the indi es from Ai _ Aj . Thus,
we have
C# (Ai ; Aj ) = C# (Ai _ Aj ) + #Ai + #Aj :
There are the following ases, the index

{ ollides with Ai { there are 2r1 su h indi es,
{ ollides with Aj n Ai { there are 2r2 r su h indi es,
{ ollides with A n (Ai ^ Aj ) { there are 2v+r r1 r2 su h indi es.
Observe that indi es olliding with Aj n Ai have been already ounted in C# (Ai _
Aj ). Further on, note that the zero index (all bits are zero) has been ounted.
Therefore

#Ai = (2r2

r

1)(2v+r

r1 r2

1) and #Aj = (2r1

Adding the numbers we obtain the nal result.

r

1)(2v+r

r1 r2

1):

Lemma 3. Given identi ation ode determined by its (v  u) matrix A. If there
is a parameter k  u and a sequen e of indi es (Ai1 ; : : : ; Aik ) su h that
k
_
j

=1

2 3
1
def
6
Ai = 4 ... 7
5 = 1v ;
j

1

W

then the id- ode an identify no more than k bad signatures. Where kj=1 stands
for bit-by-bit logi al OR and 1v is a binary ve tor of length v ontaining ones
only.
Proof. Denote A = fA1 ; : : : ; Au g as the set of all indi es ( olumns) of the matrix
A. Create the following two sets:

A1 = fAi1 ; : : : ; Ai g and A2 = A n A1 :
k

The proof pro eeds by ontradi tion. Assume that any t = k + 1 bad signatures
an be identi ed. Now we take a sequen e of k bad signatures with their indi es
(Ai1 ; : : : ; Aik ). Their syndrome is 1v . Now if there is an extra bad signature than
the olle tion of t bad signatures have the same syndrome { there is a ollision
and we have obtained the ontradi tion.
Observe that while designing id- odes, one would need to avoid using two
indi es Ai , Aj su h that Ai = :Aj where : is bit-by-bit negation as su h idode identi es at most two bad signatures.

5 Taxonomy of Id-Codes
From an eÆ ien y point of view, the bat h size is preferred to be as large as
possible. This also means that the size of the bat h determines the blo k size of
the id- ode. So to identify bad signatures eÆ iently, one would need a family of
id- odes rather than a single id- ode working for a bat h of xed size. On the
other hand, there is a boundary on the blo k size of a id- ode whi h typi ally
re e ts restri tions imposed on omputing resour es.
Given a bat h B n and an id- ode IC (u; t) There are two general lasses of
bad signature identi ation:

{ at identi ation { there is an id- ode whose blo k size equals the size of the
bat h (n = u),
{ hierar hi al identi ation { the number of signatures u in the bat h is bigger
than the blo k size u (n > u).
Clearly, at identi ation applies an id- ode and if the number of bad signatures
is smaller than t, it always works. Its natural extension for larger bat h sizes,
ould be the division of the bat h into sub-bat hes ea h of size u. Hierar hi al
identi ation applies merges signatures into sub-bat hes and treats them as single signatures so we get a sequen e of u sub-bat hes. The ode is applied to it
and identi es up to t ontaminated sub-bat hes. These sub-bat hes an be either
subje t to at or again to hierar hi al identi ation.
Assume that the eÆ ien y of identi ation is measured by the number of
tests T ne essary to identify all bad signatures. Note that this measurement is
equivalent to the number of rows in the matrix A whi h de nes the id- ode.
Intuitively, the more bad signatures are in a bat h, the more expensive the
identi ation pro ess is. Id- ode an be ategorised into:

{ odes with onstant workload { no matter what is the degree of ontami-

nation, the number of tests is onstant and the ode either su eeds (if the
identi ation apability ex eeds the degree of ontamination) or fails,
{ odes with ontamination-dependent workload { the number of tests depends
on the ontamination. Again odes fail if the number of bad signatures exeeds their identi ation apabilities.

From a pra ti al point of view, odes with ontamination-dependent workload
are very attra tive as they trade eÆ ien y with identi ation apability. The
identi ation pro ess starts by performing a limited number of tests allowing to
identify a single bad signature. If this fails, the identi ation pro eeds by trying a
new tests whi h together with the old tests permit to identify two bad signatures.
The pro ess ontinues until all bad signatures are identi ed or the identi ation
fails. Important feature of id- odes seems to be re-usability of previous tests.
The bat h validation applies a spe i id- ode, say IC (u; t). If the apability
of the ode (expressed by t) is smaller than the degree of bat h ontamination `
(` is the number of bad signatures in the bat h), then the failure is unavoidable.
Consequently, the parameter t must be in reased. Additionally, the work done
so far is likely to be lost. Thus it is imperative, to make a \good" guess about
the maximum degree of ontamination (the parameter t). Clearly, statisti al
information gathered from the past an suggest su h a guess. Note that the situation simpli es somewhat if the odes in hand trade eÆ ien y with identi ation
apability as the guess an be more pessimisti .

6 Constru tions of Id-Codes
As we know, one would wish to have an identi ation ode whi h allows for
gradual in rement of t with a possible re-use of all tests ondu ted for smaller
ts. Now we present our main onstru tion.

De nition 3. A (k + 1)n  n2 matrix A with binary elements is a OR- he king
matrix if there are k + 1 ones per olumn, n ones per row, and the inner produ t
of any pair of olumns is either zero or one.
Lemma 4. Given a (k + 1)n  n2 OR- he king matrix A. Then the OR of any
subset of k olumns is unique for k = 1; : : : ; n 1.

Proof. For onvenien e in typesetting we will write these olumns as rows by
transposing the matrix { so we are going to onsider AT . We onsider any k
rows but permute them so that the ones are moved to the left of ea h row as
far as possible. We now onsider a simple ounting argument to look at the
interse tion patters of the rows. If any two rows have an interse tion +1, the
ones (written as x) will use a total of 12 (k + 1)(k + 2) 1 olumns and be able
to be represented as:
k+1
k
k-1
x x x ... x 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0

... | 2
... |00

x 0 0 ... 0 x x ... x 0 ... 0
0 x 0 ... 0 x 0 ... 0 x ... x

... |00
... |00

0 0 0 ... x 0 0 ... x 0 ... x

... |xx

.
.
.

If any pair of rows do not have interse tion +1 then more than 12 (k + 1)(k +
2) 1 olumns will be needed to represent the patters of ones but the last row
will always have at least 2 elements +1 at the right of the row whi h have no
element in the olumn above either of them whi h is non-zero.
Now suppose that the matrix yielded that any k 1 rows orresponding to
bad signatures gave a unique OR but that there are two solutions whi h give the
same result for k rows indi ating bad signatures. We rearrange the rows in our
pattern representative, if ne essary, so one of these two solutions is the last row.
We now onsider the other solution. For the rst k 1 ve tors and the se ond
solution to over the same number of olumns the se ond solution must have two
+1 at the right of the row whi h have no element in the olumn above either of
them non-zero. But this means the rst and se ond solution have at interse tion
at least 2 ones ontradi ting the de nition of the OR- he king matrix. Hen e
any olle tion of k rows produ es OR sums whi h are distin t.
We note that this proof does not extend to a olle tion of k + 1 rows be ause
in that ase we ould only assume the last row to have more than one elements
+1 at the right of the last row whi h has no element in the olumn above it
whi h is non-zero. This does not lead to any ontradi tion.

Corollary 3. Given a (k + 1)n  n2 OR- he king matrix A whose every two
olumn interse tion is either zero or one. Then there is an IC (u; t) ode whi h
is apable to identify up to t = n 1 bad signatures within a bat h of size u = n2 .

The identi ation ode based on OR- he king matri es is eÆ ient as it allows
to re-use all previous results if the guess about the parameter t has been wrong.
Given a bat h B u of the size u = n2 . The (n  u) OR- he king matrix A is
reated. Denote A(t) as a shortened version of A ontaining rst (t + 1)n rows
of A; t = 1; 2; : : : ; n 1.
1. The identi ation pro ess starts from the assumption that t = 1. First olle tion of 2n tests T are run for bat hes de ned by rows of the matrix A(1) .
If the bad signatures are not orre tly identi ed (i.e. the bat h without bad
signatures still fails the test T ), then it is assumed that t = 2. Otherwise the
pro ess ends.
2. Assume that the identi ation using A(t) has failed to identify bad signatures
(t = 2; 3; : : : ; n 1). The olle tion of ne essary tests are de ned by A(t+1) .
Note that A(t+1) di ers from A(t) in that it ontains n additional rows. The
identi ation pro ess an be a omplished by running n additional tests
orresponding to the bat hes de ned by rows in A(t+1) whi h are not in
A(t) . If the identi ation has not been su essful, t is in rement by 1 and the
pro ess ontinues.

The identi ation fails if t  n.
The onstru tion also gives the upper bound on the number v of ne essary
tests to identify t bad signatures.

Corollary 4. The number v of tests ne essary to identify t bad signatures in
the bat h of size u satis es the following inequality:

p

v  (t + 1) u
There are many ombinatorial stru tures whi h an be used to give the required OR- he king matri es for example transversal designs and group divisible
designs. However we give a ri h onstru tion based on Latin squares.
A Latin square of order n is an n  n array in whi h n di erent symbols, say
a, b, : : : ea h o ur on e in ea h row and olumn. Two Latin squares are said to
the mutually orthogonal if when the squares are ompared element by element
ea h of the distin t pairs o urs exa tly on e. Formally, two Latin squares, L and
L0 are said to be mutually orthogonal if L(a; b) = L( ; d) and L0 (a; b) = L0 ( ; d),
implies a = and b = d. For further information, refer to [2℄.

Lemma 5. Suppose there are k mutually orthogonal Latin squares of order n.
Then there is a (k + 1)n  n2 OR- he king matrix.
Proof. We use the auxiliary matri es des ribed in [2℄.
Example 1. Let

2a b d3
6 b a d 75
1 =4

M

dab
d ba

2a b d3
6 d a b 75
2 =4

; M

d ba
bad

; M

2a b d3
6 d b a 75
3 =4
bad
dab

be three mutually orthogonal Latin squares of order 4 on the symbols x1 = a,
x2 = b, x3 = and x4 = d. De ne Mij ; 1  i  k, by

(Mij )ef =
where 1  e; f



1 (Mi )f j = xe ;
0 otherwise.

 4. So Mij ; 1  i  4 and 1  j  4

an be written as

1

1

1

1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

11
1

1

1

1 1
1 1

1

1

1
1
1

11

1
1 1

1 1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1

1

11
1 1
1 1

1
1

1

1

Corollary 5. Let q > 2 be a prime power then there are q 1 mutually orthogonal Latin squares of order q
Many other results are also known, for example for every n  3 ex ept 6
there are at least two orthogonal Latin squares of order n and for n > 90 there
are at least 6.

7 Hierar hi al Identi ation
Identi ation odes are designed to work with a bat h of xed size. In pra ti e,
one would expe t to have an identi ation s heme whi h is going to work with
a bat h of arbitrary length. Hierar hi al identi ation provides su h a s heme.
Consider a family of id- odes F = fIC (v; t)g with some well de ned parameters
(v; t).

De nition 4. Given a bat h Bu of arbitrary length u. Hierar hi al identi ation
based on the family of identi ation odes F is a pro edure de ned re ursively:
{ stopping ase { if the size of the bat h u is smaller or equal to some parameter
v so we an use the identi ation ode IC (v; t) 2 F , then we apply it ( at
identi ation), otherwise
{ re ursive step { if the size of the bat h u is bigger than the highest parameter
vmax in the family F , then it is divided into ` sub-bat hes su h that `  vmax
and there is some IC (v; t) 2 F whi h an be used to identify ontaminated
sub-bat hes where `  v and (t0  t).

The hierar hi al identi ation is denoted by HI (F ).

Hierar hi al identi ation an be based on di erent olle tions of id- odes.There
are two extreme ases:

{ F onsists of in nite sequen e of id- odes,
{ the family F is redu ed to a single id- ode.
No matter what is the underlying family
questions:

F , one would ask the

following

{ What is the minimum (maximum, average) number of tests whi h is ne essary to identify all bad signatures ?

{ Given a family F and the number t of bad signatures in the bat h, is there
any pro edure whi h minimises the number of tests ?

7.1 Hierar hi al Identi ation with In nite F
Consider id- odes de ned in Se tion 6. Ea h id- ode an be uniquely indexed by
a prime power p > 2. For this index, the ode is IC (p2 ; p 1). The family

F = fIC (p2 ; p

1)jp is the prime power; p 6= 2g

Note that IC (p2 ; p 1) an be used to identify up to p 1 bad signatures. If the
number of bad signatures is t  p 1, the ode will use
(t + 1)p + 1
tests. If t > p 1, then the ode fails.
Let #T (F ) be the number of tests ne essary to identify all t bad signatures
in a bat h B u . Now we are trying to evaluate lower and upper bound for the
number #T (F ). Assume that the size of the bat h u = p2 where p is a prime
power. Now we hoose somehow p1 < p and divide the bat h B u into p21 subbat hes. Ea h sub-bat h ontains pu2 elements. Note that we have to onsider
1
only odes for whi h t > p1 1 as otherwise the ode may fail.
Let the t bad signatures be lustered into r sub-bat hes ea h ontaining ti
bad signatures so

t=
where r  p1 1 and naturally, ti 

r
X

=1

i

ti

T (F ) has two

u
p21 . The number #

omponents:

1. the number of tests ne essary to identify all ontaminated sub-bat hes { this
takes
= (r + 1)p1 + 1;
2. the number of tests ne essary to identify bad signatures within the subbat hes. For a given sub-bat h, we ount the number of ne essary tests. First
we hoose a prime power p2 su h that p22  pu2 . As the sub-bat h ontains ti
1
bad signatures we need
i = (ti + 1)p2 + 1
tests.

The number of tests

#T (F ) = +

whi h after simple transformations gives

r
X

=1

i

i

#T (F ) = (r + 1)p1 + p2 (t + r) + (r + 1)

The number #T (F ) depends on the random parameter r and grows linearly
with r so #T (F ) is smallest for r = 1 when all bad signatures o ur in a single
sub-bat h. #T (F ) takes on the maximum for r = t = p1 1. So we have the
following orollary.

Corollary 6. Given a bat h Bu with t bad signatures. Hierar hi al identi ation
with in nite F will onsume #T (F ) tests where
2p1 + (t + 1)p2 + 2  #T (F )  p21 + 2p1 p2 + p1 2p2 :
7.2 Hierar hi al Bat hing with a Single I C (v; t)

In some appli ations, one would like to keep the identi ation pro edure as
simple as possible whi h is using a single identi ation ode or in other words
the family F ontains a single element. Again, knowing the number t of bad
signatures in a bat h B u , one would like to see how the number of ne essary
tests to identify all signatures varies (lower and upper bounds) as a fun tion of
the u and t.
Assume that v = p2 and we apply the id- ode IC (p2 ; p 1). Given a bat h
Bu. There are two ways bad signatures an be identi ed:

{ Serial identi ation { a bat h is divided into

u
p2

sub-bat hes. For ea h subbat h, the id- ode is used. This is a serial appli ation of at identi ation.
{ Hierar hi al identi ation { a bat h is divided into v sub-bat hes and the
id- ode is applied for the sub-bat hes and identi es the ontaminated subbat hes. The pro ess is repeated for ontaminated sub-bat hes as many times
as ne essary to identify bad signatures.

Consider serial identi ation. Note that if a bat h B p is lean (t = 0), it
takes one test to verify it. If the bat h is ontaminated by t < p bad signatures,
the identi ation will take (t + 1)p + t + 1 tests. Assume that a bat h B u has
been divided into R = pu2 sub-bat hes (if u is a multiple of p2 ) among whi h
r sub-bat hes are dirty and the other R r are lean. All lean sub-bat hes
one test ea h. A dirty sub-bat h Bi takes (ti + 1)(p + 1) tests where
Ponsume
r
t
=
t. So the number of tests required to identify bad signatures is
i=1 i
2

u
p2

r + (p + 1)(t + r)

Note that the number of tests is a random variable whi h ranges from r = 1
when all bad signatures happen to be in one sub-bat h, to r = t when there are
t sub-bat hes ea h ontaining a single bad signature.

Consider the se ond ase of hierar hi al identi ation. To simplify our deliberations, assume that u = p2j for some integer j . Denote #T (j; t) the number
2j
of tests needed to identify t bad signatures in a bat h B p when the id- ode
is applied to the sub-bat hes ea h ontaining p2(j 1) signatures. The following
re ursive equation is easy to derive
#T (j; t) = (r + 1)p + r +

r
X

=1

i

#T (j

1; ti );

where r is a random variable whi h indi ates the number of ontaminated subbat hes and ti are numbers of bad signatures in the orresponding ontaminated
sub-bat hes; i = 1; : : : ; r.

8 Con lusions
The generi lass of id- odes has been de ned using the test- he king matrix A.
The (u  v ) matrix A determines the ne essary tests. The syndrome is the binary
ve tor whi h gives the test results for sub-bat hes de ned by rows of A. The
syndrome is also equal to bit-by-bit in lusive-OR of indi es whi h orrespond to
bad signatures. We have investigated intera tion of indi es and found out that
to maximise the identi ation apability of an id- ode, one would need to hoose
indi es of their Hamming weight equal to v=2.
The main onstru tion of id- odes uses the so- alled OR- he king matrix.
The id- ode takes a sequen e of n2 signatures and allows to identify up to n 1
bad signatures. The ni e hara teristi of the ode is that the number of tests
an be redu ed if the bat h ontains less than n 1 bad signatures. To identify a
single bad signature, it takes 2n tests. Any additional bad signature, adds n additional tests ne essary for orre t identi ation. There are many ombinatorial
stru tures whi h an be used to design id- odes. We have shown how mutually
orthogonal Latin squares an be applied to onstru t id- odes.
We have not dis ussed the identi ation pro edure of bad signatures in our
id- ode. The problem is far less ompli ated than for example in error orre ting
odes, mainly be ause the monotoni ity of the Hamming weight of the syndrome.
In other words, indi es of bad signatures must be in luded in the syndrome. The
implementation of this pro ess an be done by

{ he king all signatures one by one and marking those whose index ollides
with the syndrome,

{ removing all signatures belonging to those sub-bat hes whi h have passed
the test (they identi ed by zeros in the syndrome). In other words, all bad
signatures are in the set
[

Bn

T (Bi )=0

Bi

where Bi is the sub-bat h determined by the i-th row of the id- ode.

Id- odes an be used dire tly to a ontaminated bat h. We alled this at
identi ation. Alternatively, a ontaminated bat h an be rst grouped into subbat hes and the id- ode is applied to sub-bat hes and identi es ontaminated
sub-bat hes. This pro ess an be done many times until bad signatures are identi ed. This is the hierar hi al identi ation.
There are still many open problems. The obvious one is whether the onstru tion given in this work is \optimal", i.e. identi ation of bad signatures
onsumes the smallest possible number of tests. Hierar hi al identi ation allows to avoid natural limitations imposed by the size of bat h and apply the
id- ode in hand to a bat h of arbitrary length. Is there any strategy for grouping
signatures into sub-bat hes so the number of ne essary tests is minimised ?
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